If control of their …rms allows entrepreneurs to derive private bene…ts, it also allows other controlling parties. Private bene…ts are especially relevant for venture capitalists, who typically get considerable control in their portfolio …rms, but not for banks, which are passive loan providers. We incorporate this di¤erence between banks and venture capital and analyze entrepreneurs'…nancing strategy between the two. We …nd that, in all strict Nash Equilibria, entrepreneurs who value private bene…ts more choose banks while the rest choose venture capital. Thus, bank-…nanced entrepreneurs allocate more resources to tasks that yield private bene…ts while VC-backed entrepreneurs have higher pro…tability.
Introduction
In the standard incomplete …nancial contracting models or models of capital structure and control (such as Aghion and Bolton (1992) , Grossman and Hart (1988) , Harris and Raviv (1988) , and Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) ), entrepreneurs derive private bene…ts because of their control in their …rm but all outside …nanciers are assumed to care only about contractible returns. This approach is a good approximation when entrepreneurs raise funds from one type of …nancier. However, when it comes to analyzing the entrepreneurs'…nancing strategy between active and passive sources of …nance, the possibility that one type of …nancial intermediary has access to returns that are noncontractible to the other changes the nature of …nancing decisions.
Our contribution in this paper begins by noting that if control allows an entrepreneur to enjoy private bene…ts, it also allows other controlling parties in the …rm to enjoy them, especially active …nancial intermediaries. This hypothesis is particularly relevant for VCs. 1 Because VCs take signi…cant control in their portfolio …rms, they may have access to private bene…ts to the extent of their control. Yet, private bene…ts are noncontractible to banks because as passive loan providers they do not have any control in the …rm. We incorporate this di¤erence between banks and VC to a model of start-up …nancing and analyze entrepreneurs …nancing strategy between the two. We …nd that, when banks and VC coexist in an economy, in all strict Nash Equilibria, entrepreneurs who value private bene…ts of control more choose banks while the rest choose VC. Thus, bank-…nanced entrepreneurs allocate more resources to tasks that yield private bene…ts while VC-backed entrepreneurs have higher pro…tability.
A VC's role in the portfolio …rm clearly goes beyond the simple provision of …nance. Typical contracts allocate considerable control of the …rm to the VCs. As equity providers, they usually have seats in the board of directors. They have rights to use …rm property and be actively involved in management. They participate in forming the organizational structure and establishing …rm's strategies. They help …nding customers, business consultants, lawyers, suppliers, and even further …nancing. The contracts also give them the right to be involved in employing or …ring key managers and other personnel. Some contracts may even give them the rights to replace the founding entrepreneur with an outside manager. 2 There are certain facts that imply VCs' concern about private bene…ts, which are not 1 Hereafter, we use VC for both venture capital and venture capitalist. 2 See Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008) , Gompers and Lerner (2000) , Gorman and Sahlman (1989) , Hellmann and Puri (2002) , Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) , Lerner (1995) , and Sahlman (1990) for evidence on all of these. necessarily monetary. 3 VCs usually care about not only the current deal with a portfolio …rm but also the e¤ect of this deal on their reputation in fund-raising and attracting promising projects (Gompers (1996) ). They may prescribe investment strategies to hedge the risk in their own portfolio rather than to maximize returns from a …rm. Many of them, especially corporate-VCs, have multiple goals. Pro…t is de…nitely the major goal but they may also have strategic goals. For example, Intel wants to promote technologies that use computing power; university-VCs care about academic prestige of technological advancements from their schools; government-VCs are concerned with innovation and employment (Brander, Egan, and Hellmann (2009) ); bank-VCs care about future loan clients (Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri (2009) ). VCs may also use the information that they have about a portfolio …rm to help it engage in strategic alliances with other …rms in their portfolio (Lindsey (2008) ). Some may care about sitting in the board of directors of many …rms, which they may view as prestigious positions for their career or as a source of individual power that may yield private bene…ts. As well-connected individuals in speci…c industries and controlling board members in their portfolio …rms, they may in ‡uence decisions so that …rms purchase services and inputs, employ managers and other employees, from their network.
To understand the implications of the di¤erence between "hands-on" contracting with VCs and "hands-o¤" contracting with banks, we consider entrepreneurs who are seeking …nance for their start-up projects. Projects yield not only contractible returns that are observable and veri…able before a court but also noncontractible returns that are nontransferable and nonveri…able. For the ease of explication, we use monetary returns for contractible returns and nonmonetary returns for noncontractible returns, even though noncontractible returns can also be monetary such as resources secretly diverted from the …rm (see, for example, Hart (1995, p. 101-106) ). Nonmonetary returns accrue only to those who have control in the …rm. Therefore, banks are not concerned with them. The VC attaches certain value to them, whose degree is common knowledge, but entrepreneurs di¤er in their privately-known concern about them.
Loan contracts with a bank take the simple debt form under asymmetric information. When an entrepreneur chooses bank-…nancing, he hires a manager as an agent and operates his project as the sole principal. Contracting with the manager involves moral hazard as his e¤ort is not observable. Depending on his own valuation of nonmonetary returns, the entrepreneur o¤ers an employment contract to the manager such that the manager optimally allocates his e¤ort between two tasks: the task that yields the monetary returns and the task that yields the nonmonetary returns, both of which use up resources.
Contracting with the VC is more involved. If the entrepreneur chooses VC-…nancing, he …rst o¤ers a …xed compensation along with an ownership share to the VC. If the VC accepts this o¤er, she e¤ectively becomes a co-principal in the project with bargaining power (in the subsequent decisions) given by her ownership share. Thus, she becomes a controlling party in the …rm who may have di¤erent preferences than the entrepreneur, which is captured in the model by her valuation of nonmonetary returns. To come to an agreement on how to have the …rm managed by the manager, as co-principals, the VC and the entrepreneur bargain over how much weight to attach to nonmonetary returns in designing the optimal employment contract o¤er to the manager.
We …rst show that the VC contract may take three forms. Consider an entrepreneur who value nonmonetary returns more than the VC. If his project yields monetary returns that are su¢ cient to pay o¤ the VC, the contract takes the simple debt form in which he surrender no ownership of the …rm, but if not, the contract takes the equity form in which he provides some ownership share and …xed compensation to the VC in exchange for the startup capital. 4 Thus, equity provision is in general attributable to ex post wealth constraints of entrepreneurs. When an entrepreneur gives an ownership share to the VC, he does so voluntarily, and this automatically gives the VC some control in the …rm to the extent of her ownership share in the …rm (or even higher in practice). 5 However, when the VC values nonmonetary returns more than the entrepreneur, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to sell the …rm to the VC regardless of the level of monetary returns. In such cases, the contract is more like an existing company's acquisition of the start-up.
We then identify the two Nash Equilibria of the model when both banks and the VC are operative in the market, one of which is strict and the other is not. The strict Nash Equilibrium is always monotone, which means that entrepreneurs who value nonmonetary returns more always raise funds from banks while the rest choose the VC. Hence, in equilibrium, bank-…nanced entrepreneurs divert more resources to tasks that yield nonmonetary returns while VC-backed …rms have higher internal rate of return. 6 The other equilibrium is not nec- 4 The VC in our model does not have any managerial input to the …rm. If there were this additional bene…t for VC-…nancing, equity form would be even easier to obtain as an optimal contract. 5 In many circumstances, VCs'control power is much higher than the size of their ownership share. This would make our results stronger. 6 This result is in line with the conjecture that Hellmann (1998, p. 71) puts forward: "[O]nly those [entrepreneurs] willing to yield control rights choose venture capitalists, while the others seek …nancing with private investors or other more passive sources of funds." essarily monotone. In this equilibrium, those who value nonmonetary returns more choose bank-…nancing, those who value them less choose VC-…nancing, but there is also a mass of entrepreneurs in between these two who are indi¤erent between bank-and VC-…nancing. This third group in principle can choose between bank-and VC-…nancing in anyway as long as the loan market clears. Nonetheless, this equilibrium is obviously not a strict Nash Equilibrium. Finally, there can also be another Nash Equilibrium in which there are only banks o¤ering …nance in the market. We show that all these three equilibria may coexist.
There are many papers focusing on the contracting between entrepreneurs and VCs and even more on the contracting between entrepreneurs and banks. However, we know of only four papers which get to the grips with modeling the entrepreneurs choice between raising funds from a bank or a VC: de Bettignies and Brander (2007) , Landier (2003) , Ueda (2004) , and Winton and Yerramilli (2008) , which we discuss in detail below. No paper we know of focuses on the importance of the value that a VC (or any other outside …nanciers in general) may put on private bene…ts.
In Ueda (2004) , bank-…nancing takes place in the presence of incomplete information on behalf of the bank, which asks for collateral to screen. VCs have better ability to evaluate projects and thus VC contracting is not subject to asymmetric information. But, the VC is able to undertake the project by herself if the negotiation between the parties breaks apart. As a result of this expropriation possibility, a tighter intellectual property protection makes VC-…nancing attractive. Moreover, entrepreneurs with little collateral …nance from VCs. Then, if there is perfect intellectual property protection or if entrepreneurs do not have su¢cient collateral to provide, there will be no bank-…nancing. She also …nds that entrepreneurs who raise funds from VCs have higher returns, in line with empirical observations. Landier (2003) tries to explain the di¤erences in forms of start-up …nancing across sectors, regions, or countries. In his model, failed entrepreneurs are stigmatized whose degree can be di¤erent in di¤erent sectors, regions, or countries. In a high stigma regime, entrepreneurs choose risky projects because their outside options are bad. Then, VCs …nance start-ups since they can closely monitor entrepreneurs in this high risk environment. In a low stigma regime, however, the outside options of entrepreneurs are better which lead them to choose safe projects. Consequently, in this safer regime, banks …nance start-ups with debt contracts which require little monitoring. Winton and Yerramilli (2008) provide an explanation for why banks use debt contracts with little or no monitoring whereas VCs prefer convertibles with strong monitoring and exercise of control. They incorporate the di¤erences in the risk and returns of …rms'cash ‡ows to explain the relative use of VC and bank loans. They …nd that entrepreneurs with higher chances of good outcomes use less informationally intensive methods of …nance such as bank loans instead of more informationally intensive methods such as VC-…nancing. VC-…nancing is attractive only when the entrepreneur's returns are highly risky and skewed, with good outcomes being unlikely.
Finally, de Bettignies and Brander (2007) combined the entrepreneur's …nancing choice problem with the double moral hazard problem between the entrepreneur and the VC. Because they jointly provide costly e¤ort in the …rm but do not fully bene…t from the return on e¤ort as they only own a share of the …rm, one important issue in VC contracting is the presence of double moral hazard problem. 7 In de Bettignies and Brander (2007) , bank-…nancing involves debt …nancing which does not distort entrepreneur's incentives to provide e¤ort in his …rm that he wholly owns. However, if he raises funds from a VC, his incentives deteriorate because he surrenders an ownership share of his …rm. In exchange, he gets VC's managerial input. They …nd that VC-…nancing is superior only when the entrepreneur highly regards the VC's managerial input or when his own e¤ort is not too important in the …rm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 derives the return expressions that are frequently used in the paper. Section 4 examines a bank-only …nancial system. Section 5 describes the details of contracting with the VC. Section 6 analyzes the entrepreneurs'choice between bank-and VC-…nancing and Section 7 concludes. An appendix contains the proofs.
The Model
We consider a unit mass of risk-neutral and penniless entrepreneurs (indexed by E). Each entrepreneur is endowed with a start-up project that requires K units of start-up capital and a manager. Start-up projects yield not only contractible returns that are observable and veri…able but also noncontractible returns that are nontransferable and nonveri…able. As explained in the introduction, for the ease of explication, we use monetary returns for contractible returns and nonmonetary returns for noncontractible returns, even though noncontractible returns can also be monetary. As usual, we assume that entrepreneurs are concerned with both monetary and nonmonetary returns from their start-up projects and 7 Cassamatta (2003), for example, points to double moral hazard problem in explaining why VCs are sources of both managerial advice and …nance rather than specializing only in …nancing while managerial advice is provided by consultants independently. Inderst and Muller (2004) explore the double moral hazard problem in a search model and explain short-and long-run dynamics of the VC industry. that both types of returns use up start-up capital.
Because entrepreneurs are penniless, they have to raise funds from outside …nanciers. There are two di¤erent sources of …nance in this economy. The …rst are risk-neutral banks which provide loans in a competitive market. They are concerned only with monetary returns from a project. If an entrepreneur gets bank-…nancing and if his …rm generates enough monetary returns, he pays back (1 + r)K at the end of the period, where r is the endogenously-determined lending interest rate. If his …rm generates insu¢ cient monetary returns to pay back the loan, then the bank seizes all monetary returns available in the …rm. Therefore, there is limited liability in bank-…nancing.
The second source of …nance is a risk-neutral VC (indexed by V C) who provides equitylike …nance in exchange for a …xed compensation R, an ownership share 1 of the start-up (where 2 [0; 1] is the share remaining to the entrepreneur), and certain control rights. Both R and are also endogenously determined and there is limited liability in VC-…nancing, too.
The speci…cation of the start-ups'production technology is based on the standard multipletask moral hazard model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) . There are two tasks in our model, and if undertaken, the project yields two-dimensional, state-contingent, observable, and veri…able returns drawn from a normal distribution whose variance-covariance matrix is assumed to be …xed. The …rst dimension of returns is monetary and the second dimension nonmonetary. Nonmonetary returns accrue only to the principal(s) of a start-up project to the extent of control in the …rm, which is assumed to be proportional to the principal's (or principals') ownership share in the …rm.
In case of bank-…nancing, the entrepreneur is the sole principal and thus the sole bene-…ciary of the nonmonetary returns since contracting with a bank is just a lender-borrower relationship where one party gets the loan in the beginning of the period from the other party and pays it back at the end of the period along with the interest speci…ed in the contract. However, in case of VC-…nancing, the VC becomes a co-principal in the project by acquiring an ownership share (and control) in the …rm. Therefore, both the entrepreneur and the VC have access to the nonmonetary returns of the project in this case.
Our contribution begins by noting that, in addition to the entrepreneurs, the VC may also value nonmonetary returns because of her control in the …rm. Let coe¢ cient i , where i = fE; V Cg, be the weight that principal i assigns to nonmonetary returns. Entrepreneurs di¤er in terms of this privately-known coe¢ cient. In particular, we assume that the coe¢ cient of the entrepreneur, E , is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; ] with pdf f ( ) and cdf F ( ). 8 However, the coe¢ cient of the VC, V C 2 [0; ], is common knowledge. Figure 1 : The sequence of events Figure 1 shows the sequence of events. At the beginning of the period, entrepreneurs privately learn their types ( -coe¢ cients) and decide whether to raise funds from a bank (denoted by B in the …gure) or the VC. If an entrepreneur chooses bank-…nancing, the bank o¤ers him a standard debt contract. The game ends if he rejects this o¤er. If he chooses VC-…nancing, he o¤ers the pair ( ; R) to the VC along with certain control rights in exchange for VC's supply of start-up capital. If the VC rejects this o¤er, the game ends. Otherwise, it proceeds to the bargaining stage in which, as co-principals, the entrepreneur and the VC decide how to have the …rm managed by the manager hired. Their bargaining powers are given by each co-principal's ownership share in the …rm. Bargaining between them determines a coe¢ cient ? that they agree on, or in words how much weight to put onto the task that yields the nonmonetary returns. If they do not get to an agreement, they get their disagreement payo¤s: zero for the entrepreneur and C > 0 for the VC. 9 Following the bargaining stage, they o¤er an employment contract to the manager (entrepreneur does this alone in the case of bank-…nancing). The manager then decides whether to accept or reject the o¤er, and in the case he accepts, he decides his e¤ort level on each task, which neither the entrepreneur nor the VC can observe or verify. Finally, the publicly observable and veri…able state realizes and all contractual liabilities are satis…ed by each party.
Returns from Start-up Projects
This section derives four important expressions that are frequently used in the rest of the paper: an entrepreneur's net return from a VC-backed project (eq. (9)), the VC's net return from that project (eq. (10)), a bank-…nanced entrepreneur's net return from his project (eq. (12)), and the monetary returns from that project (eq. (13)). Obtaining these expressions requires describing the production technology in detail and deriving the optimal employment contract with the manager under moral hazard.
Consider the manager's problem. He has two tasks to complete: task 1 yields the monetary returns and task 2 yields the nonmonetary returns. He is in a position to choose a vector of e¤orts t = (t 1 ; t 2 ) that speci…es the e¤ort he would like to provide on each task. The private cost of providing e¤ort is given by T which is a continuous and strictly convex function of t 1 and t 2 . We particularize this cost function by assuming the following quadratic form.
where k 1 and k 2 are strictly positive parameters.
Given the manager's e¤ort choice on each task, the returns are distributed with a twodimensional normal distribution with mean : < 2 + ! < 2 . We assume that takes the following linear form.
where 1 (t 1 ) is the monetary return, 2 (t 2 ) is the nonmonetary return, and 1 and 2 are strictly positive parameters. The manager's e¤ort choice creates a two-dimensional signal of information, x 2 < 2 , observable and veri…able by the principal(s): x = (t) + ", where " is normally distributed with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix
(
The manager has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and thus his preferences are represented by the utility function u(w) = exp[ w], where is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. Under a compensation scheme w : < 2 ! <, where w(x) is often referred as the wage at information signal x, the manager's expected utility is given by u
where CE denotes the certainty equivalent money payo¤ of the manager under the compensation scheme w.
We normalize reservation utility of the manager to zero and restrict attention to linear incentive contracts of the form w(x) = T x + , where 2 < 2 + and 2 <. Making use of the CARA preferences and the normal distribution assumption, it is easy to show that the certainty equivalent of such a compensation scheme is given by
Substituting (8) into (5) and using (2) show that the gross returns of the entrepreneur and the VC are
respectively, where
Note that the payment to the manager for him to supply the optimal level of e¤ort in the task of the project that yields the nonmonetary returns are monetary and therefore they appear in^ M E ( E ). Thus, the internal rate of return of projects owned by entrepreneurs with higher coe¢ cients on nonmonetary returns are going to be lower since they allocate more resources to task 2, the task that yields the nonmonetary returns.
In order to establish the non-emptiness of the participation constraint of the entrepreneur (for both bank-and VC-…nancing), the technology should be such that it is worthwhile to operate the project regardless of the owner of the project. This requires making an assumption on the face value of the project. 12 The following assumption does the job.
Assumption 1 (Face Value)
The technology is such that the face value of the project sat-
This assumption says that the face value of the project is higher than the summation of the start-up cost of the project and the VC's disagreement payo¤. When this is satis…ed, it is worthwhile to undertake the project as a sole owner and thus markets for funding start-up projects can exist. 13 We can have two other interpretations of this assumption. One may say that it characterizes the payo¤ of the entrepreneur with coe¢ cient E = 0 or the monetary return of that project, both of which is equal to 1 , the face value of the project.
We close this section with the following lemma that records some technical results that will be useful in the subsequent proofs.
Lemma 1 (Properties of Return Functions)
Consider the case in which V C E . Then, the following hold for i :
2. i is strictly increasing for any coe¢ cient lower than i , and strictly decreasing for any coe¢ cient higher than i .
3. i is strictly concave on (0; 1) and @ i ( ? )=@ ? evaluated at ? = i equals zero.
The proof of the lemma is trivial. While the …rst conclusion follows from employing (9) and (10), the others are due to the derivative of i ( ? ) being given by @ i =@ ? = 2 2 ( i ? ).
Bank-only Financial System
Analyzing an economy in which there is only bank-…nancing sets a useful benchmark for the examination of entrepreneurs'choice between bank-and VC-…nancing. As indicated in Becker and Hellmann (2005) , banks often play a dominant role in many countries. Even in the US, the VC industry is relatively small even if it is well established. According to Berger and Udell's (1998) estimations, commercial banks provide 18:75% whereas VCs provide 1:85% of Therefore, it is as if the project is operated by someone who does not care about the nonmonetary returns (e.g., by the bank), thus as if i = 0. This means that the face value of a project given by parameters f( `; k`; 2 )`= 1:2 ; ; E g is equal to 1 . 13 For bank-…nancing, it is su¢ cient to assume that 1 > K, which is already satis…ed when 1 > K + C.
all small business …nance. We later make some back-of-the-envelope calculations to match these numbers and compare the results with those that derive in the case in which both bank-and VC-…nancing exist.
Consider now a bank-only …nancial system. Let the equilibrium lending interest rate chosen by banks be r ? . The entrepreneur is the sole principal of the project if he is bank-…nanced, and his gross return in that case is given by (12) . His net return is obtained by deducting the loan repayment to the bank from the gross return of the project:^ E ( E ) (1 + r ? )K. Therefore, a bank loan is desirable for the entrepreneur if and only if
This is the participation constraint of the entrepreneur in the bank-loan market.
The net monetary return of the project is obtained by deducting the loan repayment to the bank from the monetary return of the project given by (13):^ M E ( E ) (1 + r ? )K. Therefore, an entrepreneur is able to pay back his loan in full if and only if
Limited liability is binding for all entrepreneurs who do not satisfy this inequality. Let coe¢ cient r ? be such that 1 2 r ? 2 = (1 + r ? )K. We assume that there exist nonnegative lending interest rates solving 1 = (1 + r)K and 1 2 2 = (1 + r)K so that equilibria do not derive trivially from binding constraints. Consequently,
Suppose all entrepreneurs seek for funding (which will eventually be a maintained assumption). Then, the expected monetary return from a random loan applicant's project is calculated as follows:
Here E is the expected value operator and var the variance of the distribution of .
In this setting, banks …nance projects if the expected monetary return of the project exceeds the cost of loanable funds. We normalize the risk-free interest rate to zero and thus the cost of a loan of K units of capital is K. Hence, banks …nance projects if the following technological relation is satis…ed.
Bank loan market shuts down when this technological constraint is not satis…ed, which is nothing but a standard Akerlof (1970) or Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) type of lemons problem in which the average loan applicant is not pro…table and thus not creditworthy. For what follows, we assume that the technological constraint in (17) holds.
Since the banking sector is competitive, banks make zero pro…t in equilibrium. Their zero pro…t condition is given by
The …rst term here is for entrepreneurs whose projects yield su¢ cient monetary returns to pay back their loans. The second term is for those who are unable to pay back their loans in full. In this case, limited liability applies and the bank con…scates whatever left in the …rm.
By manipulating (18) and using the fact that 1 2
The right-hand side of this equation is nonnegative because 1 ( 2 =3) 2 K. Plugging in the expression for r ? from (16) and solving for r ? gives the equilibrium lending interest rate o¤ered by banks:
The zero pro…t condition assumes that there are entrepreneurs who cannot pay back their loans (those with E 2 [ r ? ; ]) along with those who can (those with E 2 [0; r ? ]) so that banks can break even. One can easily show that the participation constraint given in (14) is satis…ed for all entrepreneurs as long as 0, which is always the case as long as (17) holds. The following proposition summarizes the …ndings of this section:
Proposition 1 (Bank-only Equilibrium) Banks …nance start-up projects if and only if 1 ( 2 =3) 2 K. The equilibrium lending interest rate in a bank-only …nancial system is given by (20) .
The Venture Capital Contracting
This section works out the details of contracting between an entrepreneur and the VC. We start o¤ by considering the symmetric information case in which both E and V C are common knowledge. This case is de…nitely too strong. In reality, the entrepreneur's information about how much the VC values nonmonetary returns should be better than the VC's information about how much each entrepreneur with whom she contracts values nonmonetary returns. However, we later show that our results extend to the one-sided asymmetric information case in which E becomes private information, which is indeed what we plausibly assume throughout the paper. 14 The basic reason for why our results hold also in one-sided asymmetric information is dependent on the sequence of moves in the model which makes truthful revelation of E a best response for the entrepreneur. We explain this in detail at the end of this section.
The VC contracting involves two stages. In the …rst stage, the entrepreneur o¤ers a ( ; R) pair to the VC. If the VC accept this o¤er, the game proceeds to the second stage in which the parties bargain over a ? that they will employ in running the …rm. Their bargaining powers are given by each party's ownership share in the …rm. This is nothing but a consensus on how to "control" the …rm. As we have seen in Section 3, they o¤er an optimal employment contract to the manager based on the ? -coe¢ cient that they agree on. We now analyze these two stages starting from backwards.
Bargaining
Consider the stage in which the entrepreneur and the VC bargain over implementable contracts. If the entrepreneur decides to raise funds from a VC, the entrepreneur o¤ers an ownership share of 1 and a …xed compensation of R to the VC along with some control rights in exchange for VC's supply of the start-up capital K. 15 Given the pair ( ; R) o¤ered by the entrepreneur in the previous stage, the two principals bargain over the choice of (i.e., how much weight to put on nonmonetary returns in calculating the optimal employment contract o¤er to the manager) whose admissible values are in between E and V C . If the principals cannot agree on a ? -coe¢ cient, the project cannot go ahead and each principal gets a return equal to their disagreement payo¤s, zero for the entrepreneur and C > 0 for the VC. 16 Thus, the pair of payo¤s to disagreement is d = (0; C).
The bargaining set S, the set of pairs of payo¤s to agreements, is de…ned by
Then, the Pareto optimal frontier of S, denoted by z, is
The following lemma establishes that the bargaining problem (S; d) is well de…ned and well behaved.
Lemma 2 (Properties of Bargain Problem) Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, S is non-empty, compact, and convex; and z is strictly concave.
The proof of the lemma is in Appendix A.1. We employ the utilitarian bargaining solution (Thomson (1981) ). According to this bargaining procedure, for (S; d) and for any exogenously given coe¢ cients , (1 ) 2 [0; 1], 2 S is the -utilitarian bargaining solution of (S; d) if and only if [ V C ; E ] is strictly increasing in and is uniquely de…ned by
The proof of the lemma is in Appendix A.2. Given ( ; R) o¤ered to the VC, who accepted and supplied the start-up capital K, the net returns to the entrepreneur,~ E ( ; R), and the VC,~ V C ( ; R), are~
respectively, where = E + (1 ) V C . That is, the entrepreneur gets a percent of the …rm but provides R to the VC as a …xed compensation while the VC gets 1 percent of the …rm in addition to getting a …xed compensation R.
Two comments on the actual determination of the joint -coe¢ cient are in order. First, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) …nd that VCs hold the majority of the board seats in 25.4% of the start-up …rms whereas the entrepreneur's seats form the majority in the 13.9% of them. In the remaining 60.7%, neither the entrepreneur nor the VC have majority and in those cases the VC and the entrepreneur mutually appoint directors for the swing votes. Whom they should hire is a part of the bargaining process we employed.
Second, we implicitly rule out the use of covenants. Therefore, it is not possible to separate the allocation of cash- ‡ow rights from the allocation of control rights. We assume one-share-one-vote norm and therefore the degree of control is proportional to the ownership share. As a result, when the entrepreneur (VC) gets a greater ownership share, his (her) share in the nonmonetary returns proportionally increases. The separation of the allocation of cash- ‡ow rights from the allocation of control rights is clearly an important feature of VC contracts as mentioned in Hellmann (1998) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) . However, our goal in this paper is to analyze the consequences of having control in the …rm, not how the control is actually allocated. More importantly, it is well-known that VCs take proportionately more control rights than their cash- ‡ow rights in the …rm, and such a speci…cation would clearly make our results stronger.
Entrepreneur' s optimal o¤er
Having derived the bargaining outcome, we now consider the previous stage in which the entrepreneur chooses his optimal ( ; R) o¤er to the VC. An optimal o¤er must maximize entrepreneur's payo¤ subject to the participation constraint of the VC (i.e.,~ V C ( ; R) K + C). It should also guarantee his own participation (i.e.,~ E ( ; R) 0). As a result, the maximization problem of the entrepreneur is given by
s:t:
Suppose that ( ? ; R ? ) solves this maximization problem. Then, we know from Lemma 3 that ? = ? E + (1 ? ) V C . For brevity of notation, we de…ne ? ? . The following proposition characterizes the solutions of this maximization problem followed by a verbal explanation. It turns out that, depending on the -coe¢ cients of the entrepreneur and the VC, the optimal way of …nancing can take the debt-form, the equity form, or the form of an acquisition by the VC. 
and the entrepreneur's return is 1 + 2
and the entrepreneur's return is 2 ?
Entrepreneurs with
In particular, both ? = 1 and R ? = K + C (debt-…nancing); and ? = 0 and 
The entrepreneur's return is 1 + 2
This important proposition, whose proof is given in Appendix A.3, requires a detailed treatment of its …ndings. Consider each case in turn. In Case 1, the entrepreneur values nonmonetary returns more than the VC. Thus, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to keep as much shares as possible without violating the participation constraint of the VC. When the project yields su¢ cient monetary returns to pay o¤ the VC (i.e., 1 2 E 2 K + C) as in Case 1a, the entrepreneur is able to keep all shares (i.e., ? = 1) and pays whatever he borrowed from the VC (i.e., R ? = K + C) at the end of the period. 17 The optimal contract here takes the simple debt form. In Case 1b, the project does not yield su¢ cient monetary returns to pay o¤ the VC (i.e., 1 2 E 2 < K + C). Thus, the entrepreneur cannot keep all shares to himself. To be able to raise the necessary funds, he has to relinquish control to the VC. What he does is then to provide some amount of shares just enough to guarantee the VC's participation. Consequently, the optimal contract takes an equity form in which both parties hold positive shares in the …rm. 18 Hence, equity provision by a VC is attributable to ex post wealth constraints of entrepreneurs.
Skip Case 2 for the moment and consider Case 3. In this case, the VC values nonmonetary returns more than the entrepreneur. Thus, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to sell as much shares as possible to the VC. This is optimal because the value of the project is higher for the VC because V C > E . The entrepreneur can make use of this situation by selling the whole …rm to the VC (i.e., ? = 0) at a price higher than his own valuation of the …rm. This case can be interpreted as a large …rm's acquisition of a …rm rather than a VC's investment in her portfolio company as a …nancial intermediary, since the "buyer" attaches greater valuation to the nonmonetary returns than the "seller". To conceptualize, it is much like, say, a large software company or a drug corporation acquiring a start-up …rm that comes up with an innovation. Now consider Case 2 in which the -coe¢ cients of the two parties are the same (a measure zero event). Since now the preferences are perfectly aligned, there are many possible solutions (i.e., ? 2 [0; 1]). What is interesting is that both ? = 1 and ? = 0 are among those solutions in the case in which the project yields su¢ cient monetary returns to pay o¤ the VC, which is stated in Case 2a. Additionally, ? = 0 is among the solutions when the entrepreneur is insolvent, as stated in Case 2b. These two points help us in comparing the payo¤s of the entrepreneur in various situations in the proofs of the subsequent propositions.
We close this section by showing that Proposition 2 holds even under one-sided asym- 17 The reason that R ? does not include any markup over K + C is simply due to the fact that there is no asymmetric information in the …nancial contracting between the entrepreneur and the VC; otherwise the no-markup result is a super ‡uous detail which does not a¤ect our …ndings. 18 Of course, this abstracts from staging of investments (which occurs due to moral hazard problems between the entrepreneur and the VC as shown in Bergemann and Hege (1998)) and convertible securities as optimal contracts (which arises due to …ne tuning of the incentives between the entrepreneur and the VC when there is double moral hazard as shown in Schmidt (2000) or Repullo and Suarez (2004) ). We abstract from all these to highlight our results. metric information in which V C stays to be common knowledge but E becomes private information. 19 The timing of the model is particularly important in extending the results to one-sided asymmetric information. First, the entrepreneur o¤ers ( ; R) to the VC, and they then get into bargaining. While the VC does not know the entrepreneur's type, the entrepreneur knows not only his own type but also the VC's type and he is the one who makes the o¤ers. As a result, the entrepreneur leaves no surplus to the VC. That is, by a proper choice of a ( ; R) pair in the stage before the bargaining, the entrepreneur always picks a point on the bargaining frontier where the VC obtains his disagreement payo¤. Hence, truthful revelation of his type E is optimal for him. We record this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Truthful Revelation)
Suppose Assumption 1 holds and V C is common knowledge but E is entrepreneur's private information. Then, the optimal choice of the entrepreneur's o¤er to the VC is as speci…ed in Proposition 2.
Because there is truthful revelation by the entrepreneur when E becomes his private information, not only the optimal contract o¤ers speci…ed in Proposition 2 but also the bargaining outcome in the stage that follows the contract o¤er stage remain exactly the same.
Banks versus Venture Capital
We now turn to the analysis of entrepreneurs' choice between bank-and VC-…nancing. Existence of an equilibrium is never an issue in this economy. An equilibrium can easily be established by having banks o¤ering a prohibitively high lending interest rate so that some (or possibly all) entrepreneurs get …nanced by the VC and the rest as well as banks remain inoperative. Such an equilibrium is clearly not interesting. We rather focus on equilibria in which both the VC and banks are operative in the market. 20 We de…ne operativeness of a …nancial intermediary as follows.
De…nition 1 (Operativeness)
A …nancial intermediary is operative if there exists a nonzero measure of entrepreneurs who in equilibrium choose it for …nancing their start-up projects. Otherwise, it is inoperative.
The strategy of banks in this game is their lending interest rate, which is r ? in equilibrium. Let the entrepreneurs'equilibrium …nancing strategy (i.e., their choice between bank-and VC-…nancing) be s ? ( ) : [0; ] ! fB; V Cg, where B denotes bank-…nancing and V C VC-…nancing. Remember that we de…ne r ? with (16) , which implies a negative relationship between r ? and r ? . Under our assumptions, there is a one-to-one map between the two and therefore banks choosing a strategy r ? is equivalent to choosing a r ? -coe¢ cient.
Given limited liability, there are three possibilities for a bank. If a bank-…nanced entrepreneur generates su¢ cient monetary returns to pay back his loan, the bank is able to get the principal and the interest, (1 + r ? )K, in full. However, bank-…nanced entrepreneurs with E > r ? will not be able to pay back their loans in full. In that case, the bank can con…scate only the monetary returns from the project, 
In an equilibrium, each entrepreneur's …nancing strategy is optimal given his -coe¢ cient and the lending interest rate r ? . The lending interest rate clears the bank loan market. The VC gets her reservation utility given the o¤er ( ? ; R ? ) of entrepreneurs who chooses VC-…nancing. Thus, we formally de…ne an equilibrium in this economy as follows. 
We later show that, in all strict Nash equilibria, 21 all entrepreneurs under a -coe¢ cient threshold choose VC-…nancing while all those above this threshold choose bank-…nancing. We call such an equilibrium monotone. We formally de…ne monotonicity of an equilibrium as follows. In a monotone equilibrium, banks play threshold strategies so that they expect to have entrepreneurs with > r in their loan applicant pool and set their lending interest rates accordingly. There are two implications of monotonicity that deserves mentioning at this point. First, r < r ? must be satis…ed in every monotone equilibrium, otherwise all bank loan applicants would have negative NPV projects and banks could not break even. Second, equilibria in which only one type of …nancial intermediary is operative are trivially monotone.
Having de…ned what an equilibrium is, we now turn to the calculation of equilibria in this economy. Remember that Assumption 1 guarantees that some projects yield high enough monetary returns to pay o¤ the VC. We make two additional assumptions. The …rst assumption is about project returns and it guarantees that there are entrepreneurs whose projects do not yield su¢ cient monetary returns to pay o¤ the VC.
Assumption 2 (Monetary Returns)
The technology is such that the monetary returns of the project satis…es 1 2 2 < K + C.
Assumptions 1 and 2 together imply that there must be a C 2 (0; ) such that 1 2
This means that some projects are creditworthy in the eyes of the VC while the rest are not. The other assumption is that the VC's -coe¢ cient is (weakly) less than C since otherwise the monetary returns generated when the VC is operating the project on his own is strictly negative, which con ‡icts with the fact that VC being a …nancial intermediary.
Our motivation for this assumption is straightforward. Even though VC-…nancing is an active source of …nancing, a VC is still a …nancial intermediary, which means that there is a pecking order in her goals. Her major goal is to obtain monetary returns from …nancing start-up projects. Provided that she can earn positive monetary returns from a project, she then tries to enjoy non-contractible returns by having control in the …rm. Thus, nonnegative monetary returns are necessary before enjoying nonmonetary returns.
The following lemma characterizes the best responses of entrepreneurs against a given r ? in each case. Because the payo¤ functions are continuous in all possibilities, we ignore without loss of generality the equality cases. Since there is one-to-one map between r ? and r ? , we focus on r ? , which implicitly de…nes an r ? value. There are three general cases to consider: In case A, r ? is such that r ? is less than both V C and C . In case B, r ? is such that r ? is in between V C and C . Finally in case C, r ? is such that r ? is higher than both V C and C .
Lemma 4 (Best responses) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. The best responses of an entrepreneur against a given lending interest rate, BR E (r ? ), are given as follows.
otherwise.
Case C ( V C < C < r ? ):
The proof of this lemma consists of a tedious check of all possible cases and is provided in Appendix A.4. A very important point to mention here is that because this lemma has no statement that stems from the distributional assumptions, our results are qualitatively independent of our uniform distribution assumption. Another important point is that, regardless of with whom she partners, the VC obtains an expected surplus of C and thus we may dispense with optimization concerns for her. We use …gures, which are quite useful in visualizing the best responses, to derive the equilibria. Figure 2 shows the best responses in case A. In this case, by Lemma 4, all entrepreneurs with > C choose bank-…nancing while those with < C choose VC-…nancing. According to De…nition 3, such an equilibrium is monotone with r = C , if it exists. However, in this case, all those with > r ? have negative NPV projects in the eyes of banks, which means that banks cannot break even. Therefore, case A cannot happen in general equilibrium. Consider now case B, which is depicted in Figure 3 . Notice that C > r ? in this case, which implies r ? K C > 0. Therefore, it is immediate to see that the best response for entrepreneurs with
Thus, the best response for entrepreneurs with E 2 [0; V C ] is also VC-…nancing. According to De…nition 3, such an equilibrium is monotone with r = C , if it exists. However, as in case A, all bank-…nanced entrepreneurs in this proposed equilibrium have negative NPV projects from the perspective of banks, which means that banks cannot break even. Hence, case B cannot happen in general equilibrium, either. Figure 4 . One can easily see that r ? K = C when C = r ? . Therefore, as in case B, for all entrepreneurs with E < V C , the best response is VC-…nancing since ( 2 V C 2 E ) 2 + r ? K C > 0. However, this time, all entrepreneurs with E 2 [ V C ; C ] are indi¤erent between bank-and VC-…nancing because r ? K C = 0, and that is why this is a knife-edge situation. The only requirement that is left to be satis…ed for a general equilibrium is the zero-pro…t condition for banks, which can be satis…ed if entrepreneurs who are indi¤erent between the two strategies properly sort themselves between bank and VC-…nancing. We call such an equilibrium a type I equilibrium. This equilibrium is not a strict Nash Equilibrium because entrepreneurs who are indi¤erent between bank-and VC-…nancing do not become strictly worse o¤ if they deviate from their equilibrium strategy. We record these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Type I Equilibrium) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then, there can be an equilibrium such that r ? = C=K and entrepreneurs with E 2 [0; V C ) choose VC-…nancing, entrepreneurs with E 2 [ C ; ] choose bank-…nancing, and entrepreneurs with E 2 [ V C ; C ] choose between bank-and VC-…nancing in any way until the markets clear. This equilibrium is not a strict Nash Equilibrium.
Type I equilibrium is not necessarily monotone. Entrepreneurs with low -coe¢ cients (i.e., E 2 [0; V C ]) prefer VC-…nancing, entrepreneurs with high -coe¢ cients (i.e., E 2 [ C ; ]) prefer bank-…nancing but entrepreneurs in the middle-range can sort themselves in any way as long as the zero pro…t condition for banks is satis…ed.
Consider the monotone version of a type I equilibrium. Suppose that there exists a r 2 [ V C ; C ] such that entrepreneurs with E 2 [ V C ; r ] choose VC-…nancing while those with E 2 [ r ; C ] choose bank-…nancing. Then, the zero pro…t condition is given by 
Substituting in r ? = C=K, incorporating the uniform distribution assumption, and solving r for yields
We have already shown that in every equilibrium in which banks are operative r ? C V C since cases A and B proved to be nonexistent in general equilibrium. Moreover, remember that r ? and r ? are negatively related and there are no other equilibria in which banks are operative when r ? < C . Thus, r ? = C=K is indeed the highest equilibrium lending interest rate in any economy in which both banks and the VC are operative. Then, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Properties of Type I Equilibrium) Type I equilibrium is not necessarily monotone. A monotone type I equilibrium is characterized by r ? = C=K and (39). Moreover, r ? = C=K is the highest equilibrium lending interest rate with minimum number of bank-…nanced entrepreneurs in any economy in which both banks and the VC are operative.
A special case of monotone type I equilibrium occurs when r = C in which all entrepreneurs who are indi¤erent between bank-and VC-…nancing choose VC-…nancing. However, as in cases A and B, banks cannot break even in this case, which means that this special case cannot happen in general equilibrium. That is why r 2 [ V C ; C ). Another special case occurs when r = V C in which all entrepreneurs who are indi¤erent between bankand VC-…nancing choose bank-…nancing. This case is indeed a bank-only equilibrium which we work out in Section 4.
The second possibility in case C is the situation in which C < r ? . The best responses in this situation are shown in Figure 5 . One can easily see that r ? K < C when C < r ? . Because r ? K C < 0, all entrepreneurs with E 2 [ V C ; C ] prefer bank-…nancing. However, the best responses of entrepreneurs with E < V C depends on whether ( 2 V C 2 E ) 2 > 0 is greater or smaller than r ? K C < 0 in absolute value. The best response of entrepreneurs who satisfy ( 2 V C 2 E ) 2 + r ? K C > 0 is VC-…nancing while the best response of entrepreneurs who satisfy ( 2 V C 2 E ) 2 + (r ? K C) < 0 is bank-…nancing. Therefore, there is a r 2 [0; V C ] in case C such that all entrepreneurs above r prefer bank-…nancing while the rest prefer VC-…nancing. Moreover, banks can make zero expected pro…ts, which means that we obtain another equilibrium. We call such an equilibrium a type II equilibrium.
The equilibrium lending interest rate in a type II equilibrium is found from the zero-pro…t condition given in (36) : 
where r ? 2 ( C ; ). Incorporating the uniform distribution assumption and solving for r yields
Moreover, the entrepreneur with coe¢ cient r must be indi¤erent between bank-and VC-…nancing, which means 1 + 2
(1 + r ? )K. Then, the equilibrium lending interest rate is given by
A special case of type II equilibrium occurs when r = 0, in which case a bank-only equilibrium is obtained. Our conclusions above lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Type II Equilibrium) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then, there can be an equilibrium solving (16) , (41) , and (42) simultaneously. This equilibrium is a strict Nash Equilibrium and it is always monotone.
There is an important corollary of this proposition.
Corollary 2 (Monotonicity of Strict Nash Equilibrium) All strict Nash Equilibria in which both banks and the VC are operative must be monotone.
We have already mentioned that all Nash Equilibria in which only one type of …nancial intermediary is operative are trivially monotone. In addition, the above corollary …nds that, in all strict Nash equilibria in which both banks and the VC are operative, entrepreneurs who value nonmonetary returns more choose bank-…nancing while the rest choose VC-…nancing. Thus, it is always the case that bank-…nanced entrepreneurs allocate more resources to task 2, the task that yields the nonmonetary returns, than their VC-…nanced counterparts. This also means that projects of the VC-…nanced entrepreneurs have higher internal rate of return, or they are more pro…table in other words.
We close this section with some start-up …nancing arithmetic. Our purpose in these backof-the-envelope calculations is not to come up with the most realistic calibrated example but rather to show the possibility of coexistence of type I, type II, and bank-only equilibria under the same parameter speci…cations. Consider a unit investment; thus, set K = 1. We assume C = 0:687, which implies a lending interest rate of r ? = C=K = 6:870% in a type I equilibrium. This interest rate is in line with lending interest rates published in Federal Reserve's statistical releases in 1990s. We assume that the coe¢ cient terms is distributed between zero and 4:2; that is, = 4:2. Dyck and Zingales (2004) estimate the average value of private bene…ts as 14% of the equity value of a …rm. We employ this as a rough measure of nonmonetary returns. So, if 2 = 1, then 1 can be found from
which yields 1 = 12:9.
Consider monotone type I equilibrium. From (39) , we …nd that r = 0:3672. This means that the VC industry is active only in the 8:7418% of the economy. Is this a reasonable number? By using the National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF), Berger and Udell (1998) …nd the estimated distributions of equity and debt in the small business …nance. In their estimations, VC's share is 1:85% while the commercial banks'share is 18:75%. This means that the relative size of the VC industry is 8:98%, which is pretty close to our backof-the-envelope calculation here. Table 1 reports the equilibrium outcomes for di¤erent equilibrium types. It turns out that, under the same parameters, we have a type II equilibrium in which the size of the VC industry is 7:3739% and the bank lending interest rate is 6:7402%. There is also a bank-only equilibrium with a lending interest rate of 6:1180%. We thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Coexistence of Equilibria) Type I, type II, and bank-only equilibria may coexist.
Conclusion
The existence of private bene…ts on behalf of the entrepreneur is now a standard feature of entrepreneurial …nance models. Unlike banks, VCs are not passive investors. They are specialized …nancial intermediaries who take considerable control in their portfolio …rms. Protective provision terms in contracts allow them to veto transactions that are unfavorable to them and board control gives them the ability to initiate new transactions.
The basic insight we underline in this paper is that if control allows the entrepreneur to enjoy private bene…ts, it also allow the VC to enjoy them. This paper is the …rst to incorporate this di¤erence between active and passive sources of …nance. Under this conjecture, we focus on entrepreneurs'…nancing strategy between banks and the VC. We …nd that, in all strict Nash Equilibria, entrepreneurs who value private bene…ts more …nance from banks while the rest go to VCs. Therefore, VC-…nanced entrepreneurs have higher internal rate of return whereas bank-…nanced entrepreneurs divert more resources in their …rms to the task that yield the private bene…ts.
There are couple of important features of VC industry, which are already well studied in the literature, that we do not focus in this paper: intensive monitoring by the VC (Gompers (1996) ); staging of funding (Bergemann and Hege (1998), Cornelli and Yosha (2003) ); usage of special …nancial instruments such as convertible securities (Marx (1998) Schwienbacher (2008 Schwienbacher ( , 2009 ). A nice venue of future research is to interact all of these features with the entrepreneur's choice between bank-and VC-…nancing to better understand the market split between the two. 6 = 0 such that i = i ( ) and 0 i = i ( 0 ), for all i. For a contradiction, suppose that = + (1 ) 0 is in z. Then, there exists a~ such that~ i = i (~ ). Hence, due to the strict concavity of i , established in Lemma 1, we have
Finally, without loss of generality, assume that E > V C . Due to the Lemma 1, we know that E is strictly increasing and therefore (A-1) implies~ < + (1 ) 0 . This completes the proof since (A-1) and V C being strictly decreasing imply~ > + (1 ) 0 , which delivers the necessary contradiction.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
The required conditions for the existence of the utilitarian bargaining solution have been shown to be satis…ed. Namely, S is compact and convex, d 2 S; and by Assumption 1, there exists some s 2 S with s j > 0 for j = 1; 2. Therefore, for any 2 [0; 1] we have N (S; d; ) 6 = ;. Moreover, since z is strictly concave, N (S; d; ) is a function. By the Pareto E¢ ciency axiom of the utilitarian bargaining solutions, N (S; d; ) 2z for all 2 [0; 1]. Recall that the de…nition of z implies that there is some 2 [ V C ; E ] such that N (S; d; ) = ( 1 ; 2 ) = ( E ( ); V C ( )): This is unique because i s are one-to-one (strictly monotone) functions of on [minf E ; V C g; maxf E ; V C g] by Lemma 1. Trivially, when E = V C , = E = V C . Without loss of generality, let E > V C . Therefore, solving the following maximization problem with …rst-order conditions
delivers the conclusion upon observing that the objective function is linear, the boundary of the constraint set is strictly concave by Lemma 2, and E V C > 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
When Assumption 1 holds, the constraint set is non-empty and compact. Thus, there exists a solution due to the continuity of the objective function given in (27) . We should consider three di¤erent cases E > V C , E = V C , and E < V C . Under each case, there are two subcases, one in which the entrepreneur is able to pay o¤ the VC (i.e., 1 2 2 K + C) and the other in which he is not (i.e., 1 2 2 < K + C). Consider each case in turn.
is strictly increasing and V C ( ; R) is strictly decreasing in . This implies that the participation constraint of the VC holds with equality at the solution ( ? ; R ? ). Thus, ignoring the participation constraint of the entrepreneur for now, we can write down (27) as
By Lemma 1, this objective function is continuous in . Moreover, the entrepreneur is solving a non-trivial utilitarian planner's problem where the weights assigned to the principals must be interpreted as their shares of the project.
, the monetary returns of the project when the entrepreneur operates it is greater than or equal to the start-up cost plus the VC's disagreement payo¤). Because that the entrepreneur is solving a planner's problem given in (A-3) and
the optimal solution is such that the entrepreneur is the sole owner of the project. In expected terms, he pays o¤ the start-up cost of the …rm borrowed from the VC, K, and his disagreement payo¤, C, in full out of the monetary returns of the project given by 1 2 E 2 . This is the unique solution of this case. Note that the participation constraint of the entrepreneur is satis…ed in equilibrium:
If 1 2 E 2 < K + C, then setting = 1 violates the participation constraint of the VC. As a result, the entrepreneur tries to compensate the VC with monetary payments as much as possible in order not to distort the returns from the project (because considering the planner's problem given in (A-3) reveals that the social optimum requires that the entrepreneur is allocated as much shares as possible). The remaining part is covered by ownership shares to the VC, which the entrepreneur tries to keep as minimal. Consequently, the entrepreneur gives all monetary returns he collects with his share to the VC. Thus, for any , R = ( 1 ( ) 2 2 ). Consequently, the VC's payo¤ at should satisfy 1 ( ) 2 2 + (1 ) ( 1 + (2 V C ) 2 ) K + C: (A-5)
Here, the …rst term on the left-hand side is the monetary returns that the entrepreneur earns from the project and the second term is the VC's monetary and nonmonetary returns.
Manipulating this yields
At the optimum, it must be that the VC does not obtain any surplus. As a result, ? 2 [0; 1] must be the maximal real number (because recall that E ( ; R) is strictly increasing in ) such that
Note that the right-hand side of this equation gives the amount of monetary returns that the entrepreneur is short on and the left-hand side gives the nonmonetary returns of the VC. Manipulating this expression yields K + C, the monetary returns from the project are su¢ cient to pay o¤ K and C. Given 2 [0; 1], the monetary payment that should be made to the VC (for whom the participation constraint holds with equality) is R = K + C (1 )( 1 + 2 2 ). If R > 0, the monetary payments need to be made by the entrepreneur to cover R calls for ( 1 2 2 ) K +C (1 )( 1 + 2 2 ), the left-hand side giving us the monetary returns allocated to the entrepreneur at and the right-hand side the monetary payment needed to be made to the VC. This implies (1 2 ) 2 2 K + C 1 . Hence, every 2 [0; 1] is a solution, because then in all of them the entrepreneur obtains the highest returns which is due to ( 1 + 2 2 ) R = ( 1 + 2 2 ) (K +C)+(1 )( 1 + 2 2 ) = 1 + 2 2 (K +C) 0, where the …nal inequality is due to Assumption 1. Furthermore, the situation in which the monetary payments to the entrepreneur from the project are not su¢ cient to pay o¤ the VC is not possible. This is because we need to have (1 2 ) 2 2 < K 1 , which contradicts to the hypothesis that 1 2 2 K + C for any value of 2 [0; 1].
When 1 2 2 < K + C, the monetary returns from the project if the entrepreneur were the sole owner are not su¢ cient to pay o¤ K + C. The payment needed to be made for a given level of is R = K +C (1 )( 1 + 2 2 ). Therefore, we have a solution if is such that ( 1 2 2 ) K + C (1 )( 1 + 2 2 ) (which implies (1 2 ) 2 2 K + C 1 ). Note that ? = 0 and R ? = K + C ( 1 + 2 2 ) < 0 is such a solution (yet ? = 1 and R ? = K + C is not a solution in this case, because the monetary payments from the project to the liquidity-constrained entrepreneur is not su¢ cient to cover K + C). The participation constraint of the entrepreneur is clearly satis…ed and he obtains the highest payo¤ possible:
( 1 + 2 2 ) R = ( 1 + 2 2 ) (K + C) + (1 )( 1 + 2 2 ) = 1 + 2 2 (K + C) 0.
Case 3: Suppose E < V C . In this case, the entrepreneur's problem shown in (A-3) calls for choosing as low as possible, because, when E < V C ,~ E ( ; R) is strictly decreasing and~ V C ( ; R) strictly increasing in . Moreover, the VC is not liquidity constrained. Finally, because the entrepreneur makes a monetary return of R = 1 + 2 V C 2 (K + C), which strictly exceeds 1 + 2 E 2 (K + C) 0 due to Assumption 1, his participation constraint is also satis…ed. This is the unique solution of this case.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
There are three general cases to consider: case A: r ? < V C < C , case B: V C < r ? < C , case C: V C < C < r ? . Due to the continuity of the payo¤ functions in every possible case, it su¢ ces to check for strict inequalities.
Case A ( r ? < V C < C ): The inequality r ? C implies r ? K C 0.
Case A-1 ( E < r ? < V C < C ): An entrepreneur's return by choosing bank-…nancing is 1 + 2 E 2 (1 + r ? )K, which is positive because E < r ? . On the other hand, his return by choosing VC-…nancing is 1 + 2 V C 2 (K + C), which is positive because E < V C < C . Hence, choosing VC-…nancing instead of bank-…nancing delivers the entrepreneur a net payo¤ of ( 2 V C 2 E ) 2 + (r ? K C). Because that V C > E and r ? K C > 0, ( 2 V C 2 E ) 2 + (r ? K C) > 0. Thus, the entrepreneur's best response is
(A-10)
Case A-2 ( r ? < E < V C < C ): An entrepreneur's return by choosing bank-…nancing is 2 2 E 2 , which is positive because E > r ? . On the other hand, his return by choosing VC-…nancing is 1 + 2 V C 2 (K + C) > 0, which is positive because V C > E . Moreover, because that r ? < C , we have r ? K C > 0. Consequently, 1 + 2 V C 2 (K +C) > 2 2 E 2 , because otherwise
Case C-1 ( E < V C < C < r ? ): An entrepreneur's return by choosing bank-…nancing is 1 + 2 E 2 (1 + r ? )K, which is positive because E < r ? . On the other hand, his return by choosing VC-…nancing is 1 + 2 V C 2 (K +C), which is positive because E < V C < C . Hence, choosing VC-…nancing instead of bank-…nancing delivers the entrepreneur a net payo¤ of ( 2 V C 2 E ) 2 + r ? K C. Thus, the entrepreneur's best response is
(A-21)
Case C-2 ( V C < E < C < r ? ): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-…nancing is 1 + 2 E 2 (1 + r ? )K > 0, which is positive because E < r ? . On the other hand, his return by choosing VC-…nancing is 1 + 2 E 2 (K +C), which is positive because V C < E . Thus, the entrepreneur's best response is
